I think I'm a bit confused about the relationship between some concepts in mathematical logic, namely constructions that require the axiom of choice and "explicit" results.
For example, let's take the existence of well-orderings on mathbbR. As we all know after reading this answer by Ori Gurel-Gurevich, this is independent of ZF, so it "requires the axiom of choice." However, the proof of the well-ordering theorem that I (and probably others) have seen using the axiom of choice is nonconstructive: it doesn't produce an explicit well-ordering. By an explicit well-ordering, I simply mean a formal predicate P(x,y) with domain mathbbRtimesmathbbR (i. e., a subset of the domain defined by an explicit set-theoretic formula) along with a proof (in ZFC, say, or some natural extension) of the formal sentence "P defines a well-ordering." Does there exist such a P, and does that answer relate to the independence result mentioned above?
More generally, we can consider an existential set-theoretic statement existsP:F(P) where F is some set-theoretic formula. Looking to the previous example, F(P) could be the formal version of "P defines a well-ordering on mathbbR." (We would probably begin by rewording that as something like "for all zinP, z is an ordered pair of real numbers, and for all real numbers x and y with xneqy, ((x,y)inPvee(y,x)inP)wedgelnot((x,y)inPwedge(y,x)inP), etc.) On the one hand, such a statement may be a theorem of ZF, or it may be independent of ZF but a theorem of ZFC. On the other hand, we can ask whether there is an explicit set-theoretic formula defining a set P∗ and a proof that F(P∗) holds. How are these concepts related:
the theoremhood of "existsP:F(P)" in ZF, or its independence from ZF and theoremhood in ZFC;
the existence of an explicit P∗ (defined by a formula) with F(P∗) being provable.
Are they related at all?
No comments:
Post a Comment